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Preface 
In January 1980, a workshop on "Proceduia1 and Organiza- 
tional Measures for Accident Management: Nuclear Reactors," was 
held at  the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in 
Laxenburg, Austria, just south of Vienna. The opening paper, pre- 
sented by David W. Fischer, formerly of IIASA and now continu- 
ing his work at the Institute for Industrial Economics at Bergen, 
Norway, was on Organizing for Large-Scale Accidents: Experiences 
from the Bravo and Three Mile Island Accidents; it is summarized 
in this Executive Report as a means of bringing its findings to a 
wider readership of decision makers in government and industry. 
This Executive Report draws on the Fischer paper to  make 
comparisons of two largescale accidents that have occurred in 
recent times - the oil blowout in the North Sea in the spring of 
1977 (Bravo), and the nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island, 
Pennsylvania, USA, in the spring of 1979 (TMI). The remarkable 
similarity of these two unrelated events in different technological 
fields provides a rare and perhaps unique opportunity to identify 
some key organizational issues of accident prevention and accident 
management. 
Fischer has capitalized on this opportunity by briefly describ- 
ing and comparing the organizations involved and by exploring 
some of the organizational issues thus raised. As a basis for dis- 
cussion and comparison of major accidents, he identifies six types 
of actors (individuals or  agencies) involved in the events of Bravo 
and TMI; they would be present in any large-scale accident involv- 
ing the production of resources. 
He then shows how these actors came to  play their roles at  
Bravo and at TMI, and how roles - and even responsibilities - 
changed during the crucial periods of both accidents. Next he 
compares the accidents, and finally he presents the lessons they 
offer us, including the areas they suggest where accident preven- 
tion and accident management as practiced today need a lot more 
hard thinking. 
This concise report should be of particular value to  decision 
makers who are involved in any way in the various aspects of pre- 
accident planning and accident response, a readership that David 
Fischer sees as a very important one. 
ALEC LEE 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
Two "Impossible" Accidents 
At 10 pm on April 22, 1977, an oil well went out  of control 
in the North Sea off Norway. By the time it was finally capped off 
eight days later, the blowout at platform Bravo had spewed some 
12,700 tons of oil over the surface of the water. 
I t  was the first blowout of an offshore oil rig in the North 
Sea, and it came as a shock to the North Sea oil industry and to  
the governments of several countries in the vicinity. All had been 
assured that such an event was impossible. 
The Royal (Norwegian) Commission of Inquiry created to  
investigate the accident concluded that "The organizational and 
administrative systems were on this occasion inadequate to assure 
safe operations." And it had more pointed words, saying that the 
"accident to a large degree was due to  human errors," and that 
while "certain technical weaknesses were present," they were of 
"peripheral significance for the course of events." 
Nearly two years later, at 4 am on March 28, 1979, a series 
of events culminated in a nuclear plant accident at  Three Mile 
Island (TMI) in the eastern United States. The plant's uranium 
core became seriously overheated within a short period. By the 
time the initial danger had subsided six days later, an unspecified 
but probably low amount of radiation had been released into the 
environment. 
I t  was the first major nuclear accident in the US, and it cap- 
tured worldwide attention, signaling to  the nuclear industry and 
governments everywhere that nuclear accidents caused by human 
error were not just things that happened in fiction. Prior to  TMI, 
such accidents were also considered impossible by many decision 
makers of industry and government involved in nuclear energy 
development. 
(( Events at Bravo 1 
Time 
22: 15 
22 April 1977 
Well 14, production platform 214 B (Bravo) goes out of control. Phillips 
receives notice at i t s  Norway head office and in turn begins its notification 
plan. 
Phillips notifies the Petroleum Directorate. 
Phillips requests assistance from the Texas-based Red Adair Company. 
Phillips notifies the Minister of Environment and the Director of State 
Pollution Control. 
23 April 
The Seaway Falcon, a fire-fighting vessel, begins to pump water at the 
Bravo Platform. 
The Director of-State Pollution Control arrives in the area and immediately 
holds a meeting to set up a provisional Action Command. He serves as 
chairman; other members are the Stavanger Chief of Police, a naval captain 
from the Maritime Operation Center, and a section head from the Petro- 
leum Directorate. 
The Minister of Environment agrees by telephone to give Action Command 
authority to control the blowout and clean up the oilspill. 
Action Command issues i t s  first press release. 
Action Command holds its first press conference with representation from 
Phillips. 
Prime Minister Odvar Nordli arrives in the area with the ministers of Indus- 
try and Environment. They confirm authority of Action Command and 
approve the actions being taken. 
Two advance representatives of the Red Adair Company arrive in the area 
(20 hours and 15 minutes after being notified of the accident). 
24 April 
All oil production in the area is stopped. 
A group is appointed for an ongoing assessment of whether chemicals 
should be used to dissolve the spill. 
28 April 
Phillips submits supplementary plan for capping the blowout, which i s  
approved by Action Command. 
The Council-inState passes a royal decree giving authority to Action Com- 
mand and establishing regulations governing it. 
27 April 
Action Command decides to bring in equipment from Britain and the US 
Coast Guard. 
All preparations for stopping the blowout are made. 
28 April 
First attempt to cap the blowout fails. 
Second attempt fails. 
Third attempt fails. 
Phillips is notified that the decision not to use chemicals still applies. 
29 April 
The oilspill reaches its maximum extent. 
Fourth attempt to cap the blowout fails. 
Paul "Red" Adair arrives in the area. 
Altogether, 330 tons of oil have now been collected from the sea. 
30 April 
Fifth attempt to cap the blowout i s  successful and the oilspill i s  stopped. 
Time 28 March 1979 
04:Ol Several water pumps stop pumping at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nu- ' 
clear power plant. Pressure in the reactor cooling system begins t o  increase. ' I  
06:OO The station manager has a telephone conference from his home with ex- 
perts f rom the operator (Metropolitan Edison) and the manufacturer I 
(Babcock & Wilcox). 
06:40 A coolant sample indicates that radioactivity is about 250 times greater 
than normal. 
Readings indicate that the nuclear core of the plant has been damaged. 
The shift supervisor declares a site emergency and begins calling outside 
agencies: the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), the 
Pennsylvania State Police, and others. PEMA calls the State Bureau of 
Radiation Protection (BRP) and civil defense authorities. ~ 
07:05 The station manager arrives at the plant and forms an emergency command / 
team. He serves as leader; other members are supervisors and operators of  
the 7 am outgoing and incoming shifts. I 
07:23 A general emergency is declared and the earlier calls are repeated. A tele- I 
phone line is opened between the control room and BRP in Harrisburg. 1 
07:50 The duty officers of  the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regional office 1 
arive at work and are notified, the NRC's first word of  the event. 
09:OO A task force convenes at Babcock & Wilcox headquarters i n  Virginia and 
decides t o  f ly  three engineers t o  the TMI  site. 
17:OO The NRC issues a press release that is misconstrued on 7 prn national \ ,  
television newscasts. 
29 March 
10:OO Met-Ed holds its first formal press conference and provides an optimistic 
assessment of the accident, predicting that releases t o  the environment wil l  
end in about two days. 
16: 15 A reading shows a high concentration of  radioactive material (1  0 percent 
of  the core's radioactivity) has been released to  the coolant system. Un- 
aware of this, NRC representative~ have informed Governor Thornburgh 
that potential danger f rom the site has virtually ended. 
30 March 
10:25 The Governor speaks on a local radio station t o  deny reports that the TMI  
area is t o  be evacuated. Other conflicting reports are publicized. 
10:45 US President Carter asks the NRC t o  put a senior official in charge a t  the 
site. Harold Denton, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the 
NRC, is then sent t o  TMI. ! 
20:OO A t  a press conference held by  the governor and presidential representative ' 
Denton, the public is told that there is no need for evacuation at that time 
and that the possibility of  a core melt down is remote. I 
31 March 
14:45 The chairman of the NRC holds a press conference and expresses serious I 
concern about the possibility of  an explosion of  the hydrogen bubble. 
21:OO Denton and the Governor hold a press conference stressing that there is 
1 no immediate danger. The Governor notes that President Carter wil l  soon 
I come t o  the site. I 
April 1 
i 13:30 The President tours the plant and tells local citizens that the reactor is stable, but  that further precautionary measures could yet be required of 1 
them. 1 19:OO The hydrogen bubble is down to  350 cubic feet and obviously disappearing, 
due to  the efforts of Met-Ed, Babcock & Wilcox, and outside experts. 
I 
The Report o f  the (US) President's Commission on the Acci- 
dent at TMI, the "Kemeny report," concluded that "fundamental 
changes will be necessary in the organization, procedures, and 
practices, and - above all - in the attitudes of the Nuclear Regula- 
tory Commission, and, to  the extent that the institutions we inves- 
tigated are typical, of the nuclear industry." 
Two major accidents had occurred in different types of 
energy development, and both had been officially considered 
impossible. Understandably, concern was great in both cases, 
despite the fact that in neither case was there significant off-site 
damage, so far as is now known. Bravo's oil slick evidently caused 
little damage to  marine life, and no oil reached shore. The radia- 
tion at TMI was largely contained, and overall health effects of the 
accident have been judged minimal. 
"Despite less-thancatastrophic damages, both acci- 
dents resulted in moratoriums on energy develop- 
ment in an energy-short world." 
Despite less-than-catastrophic damages, both accidents re- 
sulted in moratoriums on energy development in an energy-short 
world. (Both moratoriums have since been lifted.) Such stringent 
measures were probably taken by the governments involved for 
several reasons. Growing awareness of the need for safety, govern- 
mental emphasis on safety regulations, environmental awareness, 
a reaction to the reassuring safety claims of manufacturers, lack of 
experience with such accidents, and concern about the spread of 
large-scale energy production facilities, all may have influenced 
the decisions to stop offshore oil drilling plans in the North Sea 
and nuclear plant construction in the US. 
Since both accidents had similar and far-reaching reper- 
cussions, it is useful t o  compare them, particularly as to the 
organizational and administrative issues involved. A paper recently 
presented at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) makes such a comparison. In Organizing for 
Large-Scale Accidents: Experiences from the Bravo and Three 
- - -- 
"The organizational similarities of Bravo and TMI 
suggest that there are lessons to be learned about 
largescale accidents in general." 
Mile Island Accidents, David W. Fischer, now at  the Institute for 
Industrial Economics, Bergen, Norway, looked at  possible lessons 
to  be learned from a comparison of the organizational responses 
to these two accidents. This IIASA Executive Report summarizes 
Fischer's findings. 
The obvious differences 
By juxtaposing the two accidents, Fischer illustrates that 
each major accident is not  necessarily unique. On the contrary, the 
organizational similarities of Bravo and TMI suggest that there are 
lessons to  be learned about largescale accidents in general. 
Early arrival. The fire-fighting vessel Seaway Falcon began pumping water 
over North Sea oil platform Bravo a t  02:30 hours on Saturday, April 24, 
1977, 4% hours after the accident occurred and 1% hours before Action 
Command was created to stop the blowing well and combat its effects. Here 
the vessel is still pumping a t  midmorning. (Photo courtesy of Associated Press.) 
The obvious similarities of Bravo and TMI (as outlined on 
the inside front cover of this report for easy reference) facilitate 
Fischer's quest for general accident responses. However, it is also 
important to  note the important differences in the two accidents. 
Bravo was a self-contained offshore oil drilling platform of 
some danger to its marine environment but little threat to human 
life, provided its crew observed good safety procedures. TMI was 
a complex nuclear power generating plant of potential hazard to a 
large, densely populated area. As might be expected, accident pre- 
vention and management varied in two such different situations. 
Accident prevention and management at Bravo were readily 
organized under central authority. A far greater number of organi- 
zations were involved at  TMI, and their linkages were necessarily 
more complex than those of Bravo. As the two incidents evolved, 
these differences in organizational involvement influenced differ- 
ences in responses. 
The different circumstances of the accidents predetermined 
that they would exhibit many differences; some of the obvious 
ones are t o  some extent due to intrinsic factors. 
Recognition o f  the severity o f  the accident. The Bravo 
blowout was recognizable immediately. When the TMI nuclear 
core overheated, it took roughly two to  four days for a reasonable 
understanding of the situation to develop. 
Type o f  uncertainty involved. The main concern at Bravo 
was how long the blowout would continue. At TMI, it was how 
severe the accident would become. 
Nature o f  the threat. Off-site releases from Bravo were 
visible and threatening only to marine life. At TMI, the releases 
were invisible and directly threatening to human life and health. 
Nature o f  breakdown. Other wells at the Bravo platform 
were able to continue pumping oil after the accident. Repairs to 
the blowing well were not costly. The two reactor units at  TMI 
were shut down and remain down. Major costs are being incurred 
to remove contaminated wastes and replace lost power. 
Both the similarities and the differences noted thus far are 
obvious. In comparing the two accidents, Fischer looks beyond 
these immediately apparent similarities and differences and finds 
weaknesses in major accident prevention and management as they 
are generally organized and executed. His aim is to  identify com- 
mon defects in accident planning as a first step toward reducing 
the risk of such accidents happening again. 
Large-Scale Safety Systems 
An attempt to  appraise the organizational responses to  major 
accidents must consider the overall system from preventive plan- 
ning through accident control to changes made in the system as a 
result of the accident. Any safety system designed to  prevent large- 
scale accidents consists of three distinct but closely related phases: 
pre-accident planning, accident control, and post-accident re- 
covery. The recovery phase includes applying the lessons learned 
to  the pre-accident phase. 
"Sound allocation of resources will assure that the 
whole system can respond to anything from near- 
accidents to catastrophes." 
Seeing largescale safety systems as a three-phase process 
helps to  identify the linkages of organizations and individuals that 
develop and change during the course of events. For instance, avail- 
able resources must be organized for each of the three accident 
phases. Sound allocation of resources will assure that the whole 
system can respond to  anything from near-accidents to  catas- 
trophes. For accident response to  be quick and effective, accident 
management must be designed as part of a highly integrated sys- 
tem. 
The develo'pment of events at  Bravo and TMI, as briefly sum- 
marized in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report, suggests that at  both 
sites the overall safety systems for preventing and managing acci- 
dents were concentrated too much in the pre-accident phase. 
Despite the emphasis on prevention, neither accident was antici- 
pated or prevented. 
It appears, in both cases, that those in charge were overly 
optimistic. By assuming that the accidents could be made impos- 
sible, they allocated too much of their safety resources t o  accident 
prevention and too little to accident management. 
The following summaries of the two accidents also illustrate 
another weakness that is significant to  the design of large-scale 
safety systems in general. At both Bravo and TMI, an early warn- 
ing went insufficiently heeded. The event that marked a departure 
from normal operations could have been controlled. 
At TMI, alarms and responses were designed for near-accidents, 
but the response to the alarm failed to prevent the accident, and 
it took two to three days after the initiating event to  recognize 
that a serious accident had taken place. At Bravo, the accident 
itself was recognized immediately, but the earlier events that com- 
bined t o  cause it were not  recognized. 
If large-scale safety systems are seen as highly integrated 
three-phase processes, the experiences at Bravo and TMI suggest 
clearly that in both cases greater emphasis should have been placed 
on  understanding a multi-faceted accident as it develops. Before 
either accident occurred, resources could have been shifted from 
the preventive planning phase to the accident control phase. In 
this middle phase greater attention could then have been paid to  
recognizing developing accidents. 
The actors 
Both accidents were unexpected despite safety programs, and 
they were managed in a largely impromptu manner. Each actor - 
individuals or groups involved or wanting to  be involved - had a 
unique perception of safety and accident management, which 
included communication and linkage to  other actors. This appears 
t o  be an important determinant of the adequacy of organized 
responses to  largescale accidents. 
Any technology has a core of support from actors linked 
together by a common ideology o r  set of oversimplications of 
shared knowledge and interests. This ideology results from tech- 
nical expertise and gives power t o  organized technical experts in 
private and public bureaucracies. The ideology is communicated to  
other actors, including rivals and groups that may suffer from it as 
well as those who may benefit. 
For example, while setting a safety standard directly involves 
the industry or group of industries designing, manufacturing, 
supplying, using, and servicing the technology, as well as the regu- 
lator, it also involves many other actors - unions, politicians, local 
governments, area residents, consumers, rival technologists, other 
government agencies, and research experts. These other actors will 
be influenced by the information provided them, which is meant 
to promote the ideology that has grown up around the technology. 
At the same time, these actors may generate conflict because of 
their differing perspectives, and in some cases because of their own 
particular technological ideologies. 
"At Bravo, a new organization was created after 
the fact. At TMI, new roles were created for exist- 
ing organizations after the fact ." 
1 As responses to  both accidents show, roles can change quickly 
and drastically. At Bravo, a new organization was created after the 
fact. At TMI, new roles were created for existing organizations 
after the fact. Fischer identifies the major actors in any large-scale I 
accident and characterizes their responses in the two accidents he 
compares. These six types of actors played roles in both accidents: i 
Accident response groups. The agencies managing emer- 
gency situations and accidents. 
Normal regulators. The government agencies regulating the 
technology. 
Operators. The companies owning, operating, and servicing 
the technology. 
Inside experts. Technical experts from government agen- 
cies, research institutes, companies, and universities. 
Affected groups. Heterogeneous social groups affected for 
better or  worse by the technology and the accident. 
Outsiders. Unorganized but influential individuals or fac- 
tions affected by the accident - politicians, outside experts, media 
representatives, and others. 
In addition, Fischer notes that associate actors may be called 
in by any of these major actors. Outside ministries, technical ex- 
perts, research agencies, foreign colleagues and observers, and 
others played parts at  Bravo and at  TMI. 
The various actors may have different ideologies, which influ- 
ence their goals, incentives, perceptions of facts, and preferred 
choices. They are bound together by the linked management 
responses to  the accident. Since no organizational form including 
Nuclear tombstones. The four cooling towers at Three Mile Island, Pennsyl- 
vania, as seen in March, 1980, just one year after the accident. Now, more 
than two years after the accident, there is no indication that the plant will 
ever be put back into service. (Photo courtesy of International Cornrnunica- 
tion Agency .) 
all these actors existed before the accident, form and function 
tended t o  evolve on an ad hoc basis after the accident, both a t  
Bravo and a t  TMI. Responses were based largely on experiences 
during the emergency period rather than on the pre-established 
organizational and administrative responses. 
The relations of the actors involved in any serious large-scale 
accident are highly complex and a t  times highly informal. Dealings 
and decisions take place under conditions of urgency, around-the- 
clock activity, exhaustion, and frayed nerves, so that conflicts are 
likely. To  shed light on the questions of who will be involved and 
in what ways, what linkages will occur among the actors, and how 
information will be given and acted upon t o  control the on-site 
accident and mitigate its off-site effects, the next two chapters of 
this report deal with what actually happened a t  Bravo and at TMI. 
The remainder of the report compares the two accidents and offers 
some conclusions that may be drawn from them. 
Bravo Roles and Performances 
When the blowout occurred at  Platform Bravo, the central 
accident management role was given to Action Command, a new 
body created for the occasion. Although legislative authority for 
such a group existed, appointments had not yet been made. There- 
fore, its links to other major actors at Bravo were new and untried. 
As the accident response group, Action Command played a 
supervisory role at Bravo. I t  answered directly to  the Norwegian 
government, and it had representation from the Oil Directorate 
(supervising well control), the Pollution Control Agency, the Navy 
(providing support vessels, aircraft, and personnel), and the police 
(handling rescue and relief). 
Responding to the accident 
Primary responsibility for responding t o  the accident remained 
throughout with the owner of the oil drilling platform, the Phillips 
Petroleum Company. Phillips acted immediately to  fulfill its obli- 
gations, which included notifying the rescue center and the regula- 
tory agency, rescuing personnel, securing the platform, calling in 
capping experts, and attempting to contain the oil pollution. At 
the time of the accident, Phillips had no contingency plan for 
dealing with an uncontrolled blowing well, nor did it have the 
organization and resources needed to  manage the accident and its 
consequences. 
Despite the lack of preparation, Phillips shut down the other 
wells of the platform successfully and quickly evacuated it with no 
loss of life. It then sprayed chemicals near the platform to  reduce 
further risk of fire. The company notified the required authorities 
an hour after the accident, and it then hired Red Adair, an inde- 
pendent well-control expert from the US, to  control the blowout. 
Efforts to cap the well were greatly hindered because a blowout 
preventer valve had been fitted to the wellead upside down. 
While the main accident management role was undertaken by 
Phillips, Action Command played both supplementary and super- 
visory roles. It helped Phillips combat the oil slick, got oil pollu- 
tion control equipment and personnel from foreign governments, 
and provided information for elected officials and for the press. 
Action Command assessed, directed, and observed the com- 
pany's plans and efforts to cap the well while ensuring that the 
entire operation functioned as effectively as possible. It had the 
authority to  take over management of the accident if its director 
thought such a step was necessary. 
Phillips was represented at twicedaily meetings of the Action 
Command. In addition, the Oil Directorate, which as part of the 
Action Command was responsible for supervising the company's 
efforts to stop the flow of oil at the wellhead, carried on constant 
discussions with Phillips on these efforts. Oil Directorate personnel 
were not allowed on the platform during capping operations. 
The role of elected government officials was not significant 
during the management of the accident. The Prime Minister and 
two other ministers visited Action Command headquarters, ex- 
pressing full confidence in the group at that time. In addition, the 
Minister for Environment participated in some internal Action 
Command discussions of alternative measures, such as mechanical 
collection of oil versus chemical dispersion. The Oil Directorate 
also kept the Minister of Industry informed of the accident man- 
agement efforts by telephone. 
The only decision related to the accident that was taken 
without the knowledge of the Action Command was an order to  
shut down all other offshore wells in the Ekofisk area. This action 
was not considered necessary on technical grounds either by the 
Oil Directorate or by Action Command. The government called 
a moratorium on oil production in the area for its own reasons. 
Evaluating Bravo 
The most significant aspect of accident management at 
Platform Bravo, according to Fischer, was the integrated approach 
to largescale accident management taken by Norway. This was 
achieved effectively despite the hasty formation of Action Com- 
mand. Rather than continuing t o  function independently, the 
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4- Authority 
(-1 Information 
existing regulatory bodies then coordinated operations and co- 
operated with other actors who were within the command. 
The director of the Action Command had final authority 
over the actions taken by each of the existing regulatory bodies 
in their assessments and responses. These bodies in turn reported 
to Action Command, rather than to  their parent ministries, as 
their foremost responsibility. If the critical period had been longer, 
however, the relations among parent ministries, normal regulators, 
and the Action Command might have evolved in a different way. 
Another matter of importance was the need to have various 
governments, research experts, and others on tap, particularly t o  
combat pollution and provide information in forecasting the 
movement and damages of the oil slick. I t  is equally important to  
know how to  use these outside resources effectively, even in 
cases where it is likely that they will not be called in. At Bravo, 
major problems of adequate supervision, cooperation, and effec- 
tiveness arose in the use of pollution control equipment from 
diverse sources because of differing equipment designs and the 
sheer numbers of small units of varying effectiveness. 
The government regulators had made no arrangements for 
supplementing the response capabilities of Phillips during the tran- 
sition period before their own accident control body was staffed 
and available. They had hoped no accident would occur during the 
period, and they did not wish to  dilute the operator's responsi- 
bilities after establishing them. 
"Localized internal expertise in blowout control, 
fully integrated in to the accident management sys- 
tem, would have provided greater safety." 
- ~ 
Phillips, in turn, relied completely on Red Adair for the all- 
important matter of regaining control of the well. This could be 
considered a weakness of the accident management system. While 
Red Adair had a worldwide reputation in the oil drilling industry, 
most of his experience had been with blowouts on land. Access 
of the specialized equipment for controlling wells and space to  
install it are special problems at sea. The design, height, and 
complexity of the Bravo platform hindered capping operations. 
Localized internal expertise in blowout control, fully integrated 
into the accident management system, would have provided 
greater safety . 
What barring chemicals meant 
Action Command insisted that Phillips pursue two approaches 
t o  blowout control simultaneously - capping, and drilling relief 
wells to reduce pressure. Also, it demanded that the company 
mount a full-scale effort to  control the pollution by mechanical 
means and not  use chemicals that Phillips had available t o  emulsify 
the slick. Phillips had not  been prepared to  combat the pollution 
by mechanical means. Significant delays resulted from locating, 
transporting, and applying the required mechanical equipment. 
Additional equipment had to be manufactured on  an emergency 
basis, and some equipment was not  effective. 
The Action Command felt bound to  set a precedent in acci- 
dent management by accepting Norway's political decision to  use 
only mechanical devices t o  control the pollution. If the accident 
had been prolonged, more severe, or  closer to shore, adherence t o  
a politically determined principle might not have been the most 
effective course for controlling it. In the Bravo case, the strong 
fishing and environmental interests played an important role. The 
government felt they could affect public opinion on the question 
of continuing oil development. Therefore chemicals were ruled 
out ,  even though the chemical products available at  the time 
disperse oil effectively in water and are far less toxic than those 
applied after the Torrey Canyon oil spill off the southwest shore 
of England. 
"Other oil companies held back aid for fear their 
involvement at Bravo would in some way affect 
future government responses to oil development ." 
Other oil companies operating in the Norwegian sector of the 
North Sea did not  come to the aid of Phillips in this accident. A 
cooperative plan existed among the area's oil operators, but it was 
not  followed. However, an offer from an oil company operating 
in the British sector of the North Sea was accepted. 
The oil companies held back for fear their involvement at 
Bravo would in some way affect future government responses to  
oil development. Also, the only effective control measures these 
companies could offer quickly were based on using chemicals, 
which had been ruled out .  This situation has now been improved. 
Requirements for inter-company responses t o  drilling accidents 
off the shore of Norway have been established, and they include 
mechanical means of pollution control. 
Handling the communications media was a problem for 
Bravo accident management. Information was given from a central 
source, with Action Command and Phillips authorities available 
at one time and place for questioning. 
The difficulties arose from poor local facilities for accomino- 
dating the press, advance information being released by Norwegian 
media from their own sources, early preference on flights being 
given to  Norwegian media, and a lack of prepared technical back- 
ground information on the problems of  capping the well and con- 
trolling the slick. Attempts by representatives of the media t o  gain 
information interfered with the Action Command's management 
of the accident in the frantic early days of the blowout. 
Adair affair. Paul "Redr' Adair directs high-pressure water spray with help 
from his son, James Adair. The internationally acclaimed oil well blowout 
expert was first contacted in Texas by the platform Bravo operator just after 
the accident occurred and later given full responsibility for capping the well. 
(Photo courtesy of International Communication Agency.) 
TMI Roles and Performances 
The nuclear plant accident at Three Mile Island came in four 
stages. The first three occurred within a week, the fourth lasted 
much longer. 
The first stage was a loss of cooling capability, an on-site 
emergency that escalated into an accident with potential for cata- 
strophic off-site consequences. Failure to interpret this initiating 
event properly led to the second stage - several releases of radio- 
activity into the atmosphere. At this stage, responses concentrated 
on attempts to cool the core of the plant and on the potentially 
greater off-site emergency, which did not develop. 
Stage three was the formation of a hydrogen bubble in the 
cooling system. The bubble, which had not been foreseen, blocked 
coolant flow and was considered the potential source of an explo- 
sion that could affect hundreds of thousands of people. The fourth 
stage was the gradual cooling of the plant to a safe shutdown, and 
subsequent decontamination efforts. 
Responding to the accident 
As was the case at  Bravo, the accident management process 
at  TMI developed largely after the accident took place. By the end 
of the sixday critical period, an array of organizations were in- 
volved, and many other actor groupings appeared later on, as the 
emergency diminished. As more was learned about the accident 
and its different aspects, the accident management actors and their 
relations changed quickly in an ad hoe manner. 
At the time of the TMI accident, neither the operator of the 
plant, Metropolitan-Edison Company (Met-Ed), nor the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) had anything more than very 
general plans for multi-event emergencies, noncontained accidents, 
and providing public information on such events. 
Both the operator and the NRC had to improvise responses 
to the accident and its consequences, including decisions on bring- 
ing in outside experts to supplement their efforts. Met-Ed relied 
on the designer and manufacturer of the reactor cooling systems, 
Babcock & Wilcox Inc., and on other expertise available from the 
nuclear industry. The NRC relied on the nuclear industry and on 
the US Department of Energy's national research laboratories. The 
NRC played a dual role. As regulator, it supervised Met-Ed's acci- 
dent management responses. As a source of expertise, it also sup- 
plemented the responses. 
The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) 
and the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological Protection (BRP) 
became part of the off-site accident management organization 
upon declaration of an emergency by Met-Ed. The efforts of these 
state agencies were supplemented by requested help from several 
federal agencies having greater resources for transportation, com- 
munications, and radiation monitoring. The US Department of 
Energy monitored atmospheric radiation from the accident and 
used a computer model to predict affected areas and possible 
damage. 
For all the actors at TMI, gaining accurate, adequate, and 
timely information was a major problem. The problem was made 
worse by the communications media, which besieged officials at 
the site, at Harrisburg (the state capital), and at Washington for 
information that sometimes proved conflicting or alarming. Gener- 
ally, reporting at the site by local media was more accurate than 
by national and international media throughout the course of the 
accident. 
Faced with varying technical interpretations of the severity 
of the accident, conflicting information on radiation releases, and 
a recommendation from the NRC in Washington to evacuate the 
area, the governor of Pennsylvania asked the President of the US 
for clarification of technical information and public health and 
safety implications. 
As in the case of Bravo, the operator had primary responsi- 
bility for controlling the reactor. Responsibility for evacuation 
and monitoring off-site radiation rested with the state. The NRC 
was drawn in as concern over the severity of the accident grew and 
more information was sought from the commission, and as the 
potential effects on public health in the plant area became apparent. 
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The NRC did not have an accident management role at the 
outset. It  became involved when the public became distrustful of 
information provided by Met-Ed. Public health and safety were 
also concerns of the NRC in taking on an active role in assessing 
and recommending protective actions at  the plant and surrounding 
area and in serving as official spokesman for releasing information 
to the press. 
Its new and unexpected role in a major nuclear accident 
caused the NRC several problems. Communications between 
Washington headquarters and the regional staff were poor. This 
resulted in discrepancies in understanding technical information 
and in giving advice to experts at  the plant and state officials. 
The lack of  experience with such accidents, technical information, 
and scenarios for potential developments caused delay in under- 
standing the essential nature of the accident and in formulating 
appropriate responses to it. 
- - 
"Statements from NRC headquarters on potential 
radiation, core melt down, and the hydrogen bubble 
sometimes resulted in needless alarm." 
Despite the central role taken by the NRC in providing the 
public with information about the accident, a number of official 
sources of information were available t o  the communications 
media and to state officials. This encouraged conflicting reports, 
and in addition, statements from NRC headquarters o n  potential 
radiation, core melt down, and the hydrogen bubble resulted in 
confusion and needless alarm. 
Another problem resulting from the major ad hoc role taken 
on short notice by NRC was that it reduced the role of the opera- 
tor ,  Met-Ed, which had responsibility for controlling the plant. 
In particular, NRC's activities reduced Met-Ed contacts with the 
state public health people (PEMA), with state radiation experts 
(BRP), with county officials, and with the press. 
Evaluating TMI 
The most significant aspect of accident management a t  TMI, 
in Fischer7s view, was the unintegrated approach taken. The fact 
that the regulatory bodies, the plant operator, and other groups 
called in t o  respond to  the accident were not  under a unified com- 
mand contributed to many of the problems and difficulties that 
arose. 
The NRC headquarters in Washington did not make use fully 
of the onsite knowledge gained by its own regional office. It then 
contributed to confusion and anxiety among actors and the public 
by issuing statements to the Governor of Pennsylvania and the 
press that overstated the need for evacuation and the explosive 
potential of the hydrogen bubble. 
At the outset, no one appeared to  have final authority, and 
this prompted the Governor to ask the President to  direct one man 
to take responsibility for onsite activities. The arrangements that 
thus evolved, as outlined above, might have been difficult to main- 
tain if the accident had been more severe or more prolonged and 
had required evacuation of a large area. 
Clearly, there was a need for predetermined roles. Accident 
management responses should be based on research that has been 
carried out before the fact. Regulators, experts, and support 
people should know how they will be used and how they will fit 
into the organization hierarchy before an emergency occurs. Re- 
lease of information should be planned so that it has desirable 
effects and does not cause unnecessary anxiety and confusion. 
The nuclear-industry accident-management plans are based 
on taking no chances, with emphasis on reactor shutdown, emer- 
gency cooling, and containment capabilities. While these safety 
measures were providsd for at TMI, it was also possible for the 
operator to  override the system. This puts the whole safety system 
into question. 
A similar accident occurred at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant a 
year before TMI, and though early warning signs were ignored, no 
serious accident resulted. The NRC could have learned from that 
accident and passed on valuable knowledge to  the TMI operator, 
but did not do so in time to  help prevent the accident that took 
place. 
The confusing information and recommendations from a 
variety of sources and the uncertain links between actors were 
potentially serious shortcomings of the system at the start. Only 
the swift and strong action of the governor to put himself in charge 
of state information sources remedied the worst of the problem. 
Politicians thus had significant direct and supportive roles. 
The combined appearances of the US President, the Governor, 
and the NRC accident manager demonstrated a meeting of the 
minds on the nature of the accident and the appropriate responses. 
This served to counteract the confusion and anxiety that had 
developed over the event. 
It is true that the results of prolonged releases of large 
amounts of radiation at TMI could have been catastrophic. How- 
ever, such releases did not take place, and a hydrogen explosion 
was never even a possibility. If the accident had been more severe, 
the evacuation plans that were underway would no doubt have 
reduced radiation effects on residents of the surrounding area. 
However, if evacuation of a 20-mile radius had proved necessary, 
650,000 people would have been involved, and achieving an evacu- 
ation of this scale would have been extremely difficult with the 
resources readily available. 
What off-site implications meant 
Of considerable significance in the TMI accident was the fact 
that the electric utility operating the plant, Met-Ed, had primary 
responsibility for responding t o  an accident confined to  the perim- 
eter of the plant site. As soon as the accident was recognized, the 
plant staff summoned technical engineers from its parent company 
to help with the containment effort. Also, the plant supervisor 
brought in representatives of Babcock & Wilcox, the company that 
designed and constructed the reactor cooling systems, their con- 
trols, and their instrumentation. 
"At a later stage the nuclear industry set up an 
ad hoc advisory group consisting of representa- 
tives from nuclear industry." 
At a later stage in the accident, Met-Ed asked for and got 
help from the nuclear industry, which set up an ad hoe advisory 
group consisting of representatives from several nuclear utilities 
and suppliers. Then, since the consequences of the accident went 
beyond the plant itself and into the adjacent environment, and 
even beyond, the plant supervisor also notified PEMA, BRP, the 
regional office of NRC, the local county, General Public Utility 
Company (Met-Ed's parent company), the Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, and the Pennsylvania State Police. 
The responsibilities of  some of these actors are worth noting 
briefly. The state of Pennsylvania bears primary responsibility for 
the health and protection of its citizens. Its agency for responding 
t o  the emergency was PEMA, a group created in 1978 from an 
existing body called the Civil Defense Council. This agency has 
long been concerned with evacuation planning and execution, and 
in fact has had some experience with it. 
BRP, the state bureau responsible for radiation protection, 
including responses to  any nuclear accidents, also monitors off-site 
The risks of haste. The Pennsylvania State Governor's Emergency Control 
Center, seen here, was hastily set up in the sub-basement of the State Capitol 
in Harrisburg to coordinate all state and federal responses. While this center 
was the source of information on evacuation, the Pennsylvania Emergency 
Management Agency (PEMA) was responsible for executing evacuation. For 
a crucial period, PEMA was cut off from the Emergency Control Center and 
had to rely on the press for its information. (Photo courtesy of Associated 
Press.) 
radiation. It must recommend protective measures including evac- 
uation. Monitoring actually became a three-actor response. BRP 
kept contact with Met-Ed's monitoring efforts, but because of a 
lack of monitoring and radio equipment, a federal monitoring 
team was called in from Brookhaven. 
The similarity to events nearly two years earlier at Platform 
Bravo does not extend to the organizational structure. The diffi- 
culties that arose at TMI can largely be attributed to the fact that 
accident management was split among several actors. 
There was the on-site accident center established at the 
TMI plant run by Met-Ed and supplemented by an NRC staff that 
included one man who became the source of all technical and on- 
site information. In addition, an off-site accident management 
center in the Governor's office coordinated all state and federal 
responses. This center was the source of information on evacua- 
tion and other protective measures. Finally, the President's office 
coordinated federal agency responses for emergency relief and pro- 
vided information on these efforts. 
This three-way split in accident management served to coor- 
dinate responses and to consolidate information sources from 
many to  merely three. However, the new arrangements failed to 
bring information on off-site radiation under one of its three infor- 
mation centers. So the main sources of information on any conse- 
quences adverse to local and area residents remained BRP, NRC, 
and other state and federal monitoring groups - all of whom con- 
tinued to maintain ready contact with the press. 
The three-headed approach had another important weakness. 
I t  left out three key actors, at least to some extent. The utility 
(Met-Ed) and its industrial advisors, who collectively represented 
primary responsibility and the most experience with matters at 
hand, ended with a reduced role and no contact with the press. 
Washington headquarters of the NRC, which was a source of regu- 
latory and safety expertise despite also being the source of misin- 
formation and alarming scenarios, was also cut off from the press. 
Even less desirable was PEMA's situation. Headquarters for 
evacuation planning, preparation, and execution found itself cut 
off, not only from the press, but from the Governor's office. 
Undoubtedly, had the accident grown more severe and been 
prolonged, all three of these somewhat neglected actors would 
have had very important roles. Met-Ed, the nuclear industry, and 
NRC headquarters would have become increasingly involved with 
accident management and with the media, and if evacuation had 
been necessary, PEMA would have had primary responsibility. 
Comparing the Responses 
The similarities and differences in the ways the actors re- 
sponded at Bravo and at TMI throw light on accident prevention 
and management in general. The similarities of the two accidents 
make the comparison easier. However, some important differences 
in the two accidents account in significant measure for the differ- 
ences in responses. Also, there were successes and failures in both 
cases, so that neither accident can be seen as a model of how acci- 
dent management should or should not proceed. 
Unquestionably, the regulation, operation, and safety needs 
of a nuclear power plant in a densely populated sector of the US 
are a much larger and more complex responsibility overall than 
responsibility for an offshore drilling platform in the North Sea. 
Because of the greater scope of responsibility, authority neces- 
sarily had t o  be more divided at TMI than at Bravo. 
Fischer recognizes the important differences in scope of the 
two accidents, but he nevertheless draws the conclusion that an 
integrated system of accident prevention and management works 
best. He demonstrates the need for integration by comparing the 
responses of his six major types of actors at  each accident. 
"At Bravo a virtually on-the-spot decision was made 
to put all regulatory and supportive actors into 
Action Command under a single leader." 
Accident response groups. There was a big difference in the 
way authority to  act evolved in the two cases, which related to  the 
differences in scope. At Bravo a virtually on-the-spot decision was 
made by the Minister for Environment to put all major regulatory 
and supportive actors into Action Command under a single leader. 
This response had in fact been part of an outline plan, but it 
had never been implemented. Implementation was oral, coming 
within hours of the accident itself. All on-site and offsite re- 
sponses - including release of information to the public - then 
came from Action Command, which was the direct representative 
of the government. This meant that no political officials had to  
participate in management decisions directly. 
Action Command worked closely with the governmental 
regulatory agencies and allowed primary responsibility for manag- 
ing onsite control (capping the well) and off-site control (contain- 
ing the spreading oil slick) to  remain with the operator of the off- 
shore drilling platform. 
All official statements released to the press came from Action 
Command. This eliminated any possibility of conflicting reports 
and alarming speculations from government or other sources. 
It had been clearly established before the accident took place 
that the operator was responsible for accident control. I t  was also 
clear that Action Command had auth-ority to take over manage- 
ment from the operator if this was considered to  be necessary in 
the public interest. 
At TMI, the original plan had been to keep accident control 
centralized. The operator's loss of credibility and the growing 
apprehensions of the public forced the NRC in. Responsibility for 
on-site accident management was then delegated to  an NRC man, 
Harold Denton, while off-site responsibility rested largely with the 
Governor. 
The organizational form was decentralized in three separate 
headquarters. Each had responsibilities reflecting their normal 
jurisdictions. For these three organizations, understanding the 
accident and communicating clearly became crucial, particularly 
for actors responding at a distance from the site. 
The two individuals directing on-site and off-site activities - 
the Governor and the designated representative of the NRC - 
held joint press conferences to provide information to  the media. 
PEMA, the state agency responsible for evacuation, did not receive 
needed information from the Governor's office during the latter 
stage of the accident. 
Direct responsibility for onsite management of the accident 
became unclear during the course of events as the NRC became 
increasingly involved in cooling the reactor. No predetermined 
authority allowed this federal agency to take over management of 
the accident from the public utility it had licensed to operate the 
plant. The operator's evolving background role extended to being 
requested by NRC not to attend press briefings or issue informa- 
tion t o  the press. 
Normal regulators. The NRC first took an impromptu role in 
managing the accident from Washington and soon assigned a man 
in charge on the site (on the direction of the President). The NRC 
role at the site contributed to effective management and improved 
the quality of public information. Its role was partly active (man- 
aging the release of information) and partly passive (supervising 
the operator's efforts to  control the accident). 
Postmortem begins. Three US congressmen, James Weaver of Oregon, Morris 
Udall of Arizona, and Austin Murphy of Pennsylvania, view the control 
room of the TMI plant six weeks after the accident. They were members of 
the House Subcommittee on Energy that later held hearings on nuclear power. 
(Photo courtesy of Associated Press.) 
During the Bravo accident, by contrast, the on-site govern- 
~ e n t a l  regulator, the Oil Directorate, played only a passive role, 
hecking and assessing the prospective plans for controlling the 
ccident. The regulating agency for offsite responses was the Pol- 
 tio on Control Authority, which played a supplementary role by 
zquiring the operator of the platform to  use mechanical pollution 
ontrol devices and by helping t o  acquire and apply them. 
Operators. At both accidents, Bravo and TMI, the operators 
ad primary responsibility for preventing and responding to acci- 
ents. Phillips Petroleum Company, the owner and operator of the 
~ravo oil production rig, and Metropolitan Edison Company, the 
perator of the TMI nuclear plant, proceeded in similar ways. 
'hey protected their employees at  the site, called in industrial 
xperts to  supplement their accident-control efforts, and notified 
nd cooperated with government regulators and accident managers. 
'0th operators complied with the wishes of government officials 
n releasing information t o  the press. 
Once the accidents had occurred, experts from 
lsewhere in the industry assumed key roles in 
ringing each of them under control." 
Neither operator relied on previously developed assessments 
f alternatives for the events confronting them. In both cases, the 
~pervisory and operational staffs did not respond correctly while 
le accident was still preventable. Once the accidents had occurred, 
~ p e r t s  from elsewhere in the industry assumed key roles in bring- 
ig them under control. 
Inside experts. Specialized inside experts had similar tasks at 
0th accidents. These included assisting onsite and offsite control 
nd tracking and predicting offsite effects. At Bravo no roles for 
sperts had been developed ahead of time, so they had to be 
~itiated on the spot. 
Bravo scientists generally agreed on the seriousness of the 
lreat posed by the accident and on predictions concerning it. At 
MI considerable disagreement arose over the nature and conse- 
uences of the accident and its radioactive emissions. Integrated 
Aes had not been developed. 
Affected groups. A destructive oil slick produced at Bravo 
kreatened marine life and the residents of nearby coastal commu- 
ities. An invisible radioactive cloud threatened residents of the 
MI area, and a more serious accident would have expanded the 
threat to a large heavily populated area of the eastern US. How- 
ever, neither accident resulted in major adverse effects on workers, 
residents, or the biological environment. 
At Bravo and at TMI no public information roles or facilities 
had been planned ahead of time. Information from a variety of 
sources, some of it inaccurate, caused confusion at both accidents. 
This was a greater problem at TMI, where the scope and implica- 
tions of the accident were also greater. In both cases, press repre- 
sentatives for the most part lacked technical knowledge for judging 
the information they received or for asking accident managers 
appropriate and answerable questions. 
Outsiders. Outside experts used both occasions as opportu- 
nities for airing their personal views of the respective energy tech- 
nologies and their implications for the environment and mankind. 
These views contributed to  public alarm during both accidents and 
influenced the decisions in both cases to  declare moratoriums on 
further energy production of the type involved. 
Foreign observers at each accident demanded extensive infor- 
mation because of the potential consequences in their countries. 
At Bravo, foreign observers were present throughout the accident. 
They observed the deliberations of Action Command firsthand, 
tracked the direction and extent of the oil slick from aircraft, and 
played essential roles in efforts to contain the slick. The Bravo acci- 
dent led to  closer cooperation between Norway and the United 
Kingdom on matters relating to accident management. 
At TMI, foreign observers were present at the NRC Washington 
office during and after the accident, and afterward at the plant 
location. In addition to  sending observers to  both accidents, 
various international agencies have deliberated over the implica- 
tions of the accidents. The discussion has been based to a large 
measure on the information about the two accidents generated 
during the first hectic crisis days. 
The ad hoc nature of accident management in both cases 
has the advantage of allowing outsiders - actors affected by the 
accidents, useful experts, and others - to come into the system. 
But this could lead to interference with the system and to  wrong 
interpretations of events, both within the system and for the 
public. 
A well-planned accident management system should allow for 
including external actors, such as influential involved groups. These 
actors should be identified, contacted, and integrated in the sys- 
tem where this can be done without provoking controversy un- 
necessarily. 
Lessons and Suggestions 
It can be seen from the experiences at Bravo and at TMI that, 
from the organizational point of view, accidents are not neces- 
sarily unique. There are similarities that suggest lessons applicable 
t o  accidents in general. Fischer's paper brings out several possible 
lessons to  be learned from Bravo and TMI: 
A central organization is critical to smooth management 
of accidents. 
An overly optimistic predisposition can cause excessive 
allocation of safety resources to accident prevention at the ex- 
pense of accident management. 
All potentially participating individuals and organizations 
should have clear, preplanned roles. 
Accident management plans can be more flexible and better 
designed to deal with rare contingencies if they are developed 
through a dialectic process with all affected parties involved. 
Some common weaknesses 
Fischer draws several more-specific conclusions from his 
comparison of the two accidents. They are not meant t o  be defini- 
tive and final, but merely interpretations of the official responses 
t o  the two events that warrant further consideration by those 
concerned with largescale accident prevention and management. 
In each case, predetermined, a priori roles in accident manage- 
ment were lacking for most of the actors involved. The accident 
response actors were not prepared for immediate active involve- 
ment at  or away from the site. A major Norwegian response sys- 
tem had been legislated and was being prepared, but there was no 
plan for the interim until the system could be completed. The US 
NRC had no plan for active involvement in an uncontained nuclear 
accident . 
Lack of predetermined roles extended in both cases to the 
normal regulatory agencies of the government, the operators of 
the facilities, industry and government experts, scientific experts, 
outside experts, high political officials, the press, and representa- 
tives of groups of people who might be affected by the accident. 
- -  -- - 
"The need here is to plan for the unexpected, to 
take into considera tion the fact that preventable 
accidents can nonetheless occur." 
-- - -- - 
It appears from both experiences that accident planning is 
not extensive for accidents that are considered preventable. Both 
accidents were later found to be wholly preventable, and yet both 
of them did happen. The need here is to plan for the unexpected, 
to take into consideration the fact that preventable accidents can 
nonetheless occur. 
The transition period at  Bravo also provides a lesson. Since 
such periods are inevitable, effective responses should be planned 
for them. Accidents, if anything, are more likely during such times, 
because integrated prevention and accident management roles are 
then unclear and safety procedures may not be fully articulated. 
After both accidents occurred, substitute decision makers 
came on the scene. At Bravo, the new Action Command took over 
and Red Adair and other experts were called on the scene without 
any preplanning to  handle wellcapping and pollution-control 
operations. The void at TMI was filled by the two highest level 
politicians with jurisdiction over the geographical area, and also by 
industry experts and an administrator from the highest govern- 
mental agency with jurisdiction, all of whom played roles at TMI 
for which they had had no forewarning. 
Using substitute decision makers raises questions of authority, 
responsibility, liability, appropriate alternatives for management, 
and the effects on future working patterns at the two facilities, 
and in particular the relations between the operator and the nor- 
mal regulator. Once the accident is over and under control, the 
substitute actor has completed his task, which leaves the normal 
regulator and operator to  cope with and adjust to the consequences 
of someone else's actions. 
Another complication of authority relations occurred after 
both accidents, when temporary investigatory actors came on the 
scene at Bravo and TMI. This further altered the relations between 
the regulators and the operators of each facility. 
A more effective arrangement would be to  have such substi- 
tute actors as accident managers and accident investigators work 
through or with the normal regulators and operators. This would 
reinforce the assumption that accident management requires 
special attention by both regulator and operator. This would not 
only smooth the transition to the post-accident phase, but also 
strengthen the pre-accident phase, which is concerned with pre- 
vention. 
In neither accident were the roles of outside actors antici- 
pated. Politicians, the press, outside experts, foreign observers, and 
representatives of threatened groups all played important roles 
during and after the two accidents. To the extent that such actors 
can be expected to  become involved, they should be included in 
accident planning. 
A centralized organizational form, with accident headquarters 
near the accident, proved advantageous at Bravo, particularly 
because it allowed for the consolidation of information sources. 
Despite the far greater complexity of events at TMI, central con- 
trol from the outset would appear t o  have been able t o  avoid the 
difficulties with information flow that were resolved later. 
Some broader implications 
The damage sustained in the accidents at Bravo and at TMI 
was not, in Fischer's view, the most significant result of the events. 
Bravo caused a halt in offshore oil drilling plans in the northern 
part of the North Sea. TMI stopped the construction and licensing 
of nuclear power plants in the US. Both moratoriums have since 
been lifted despite the fact that provisions for accident prevention 
and management of both types of energy production have not 
been drastically altered since the accidents took place. 
Technical means for containing the consequences of an acci- 
dent in any case appear to reduce only the immediate effects on 
the threatened environment and people. Politicians, the press, and 
the general public can cause long-range effects without regard for 
their full consequences. The question of whether to  continue to 
develop nuclear power or to  extract offshore oil without interrup- 
tion, for example, should not be resolved as a response to  public 
concern over a single accident that caused little damage. Therefore, 
a wider range of consultations is needed, particularly with inter- 
ested groups outside the direct accident management circle, t o  
reduce the possibility of inappropriate political responses to acci- 
dents that occur. 
Much of the available research resources has been applied to  
the technological aspects of accident prevention. Fischer concludes 
from his overview of Bravo and TMI that there is need for research 
based on systems analysis, using social scientists as an integral part 
of the research process. Accident-management systems such as the 
two cases in point are based on individual actors and organizational 
actors. Investigators have attributed both Bravo and TMI to  weak- 
nesses among the actors responsible for preventing preventable 
accidents. These weaknesses had not been studied or accounted 
for in the pre-accident phases of either event. 
Fischer also wants a broader approach to  accidents to  elimi- 
nate oversights that result from adherence to  professional ideologies. 
Collective wisdom, or mindset, discourages questioning assump- 
tions - which is the most important part of accident prevention. 
The hard questions came in the post-accident phase of these acci- 
dents, which of course is essential. But an imaginative and deep- 
probing process of questioning must also be structured in the pre- 
accident phase. 
"To some actors, now that an impossible accident 
has occurred and its causes have been corrected, an 
accident is once again impossible." 
In preparing the paper from which this executive report is 
derived, Fischer found that regulators, operators, experts, and 
other actors often referred to  the accident in question as "unique." 
Each accident was thought impossible because indepth safety 
technologies applied were generally superior to  those of other 
industries or those used in the past. The accidents that neverthe- 
less occurred were seen as one-time configurations of weaknesses. 
These assumptions lead to others. Since the one-time com- 
bination of weaknesses had now been accounted for and corrected, 
it could never happen again. To some actors, now that an impos- 
sible accident has occurred and its causes have been corrected, an 
accident is once again impossible. The similarity of these two acci- 
dents shows that uniqueness is a myth, and it also suggests that 
further comparative studies of other accident-prevention and 
accident-management systems would prove useful. 
For some the risk remains. Two years after the accident, protective suits and 
other precautions are needed within the building housing the damaged TMI 
reactor. Here technicians enter the Unit Two reactor containment building in 
February 1981 with one of eight cameras in a closed-circuit TV system that 
now monitors the activities of anyone inside the building. (Photo courtesy of 
Associated Press.) 
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